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Film-Thinking and Narrative Indeterminacy 
 
Jimmy Billingham, Independent Scholar 
 
 
Abstract: This article elaborates on Daniel Frampton’s concept of “film-thinking” to propose a novel 
conception of the status of the narrative event presented in film, providing an alternative to previous 
conceptions of narration and agency in film. More specifically, the article develop Frampton’s idea that the 
moving images of film manifest a particular and unique mode of “thought,” with the agent of this thought 
immanent within the images that it “thinks.”  Frampton terms this agent a “filmind” and regards it as 
transsubjective, it is not an objective perspective, outside the world of the film, nor a subjective character 
perspective within it, but is immanent within the film-world which constitutes its intentionality as a unique mode 
of thought.  The article utilises this model of filmic agency and the underlying ontological indeterminacy to 
reconsider the status of narrative events presented in the moving image of film and how we may conceptualise 
narrative agency and viewer activity in relation to this, especially with regards to flashbacks, voice-over and 
unreliable narration. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The work of Christian Metz introduced the idea that film narrative can be analysed in 
terms of a diegetic telling as well as having a mimetic basis, with analogical images of reality 
arranged to tell a story. Metz identifies a grand imagier who is responsible for the selection 
and ordering of the film images, which he locates as “situated somewhere behind the film, 
and representing the basis that makes the film possible” (21). We have here an early 
conception of narrational filmic agency, positing an external agent responsible for the film. 
This is a function that is explored with increasing sophistication throughout subsequent film 
theory. 
 
  One of the most comprehensive arguments for the necessity of a filmic narrator is 
provided by Seymour Chatman, who elaborates the narratological ideas of Metz. He 
describes this figure as:  
 
the transmitting agency, immanent to the film, which presents the images we see and 
the sounds we hear. It is not the filmmaker or production team but bears the same 
relation to those real people as does the narrator to the real author of a novel. Neither 
is it a voiceover that introduces the action, though that voiceover may be one of its 
devices. (211n) 
 
For Chatman, a narrator is responsible for the communication of narrative in film. A 
parallel between Chatman’s narrator and Metz’s grand imagier can be identified here, in that 
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both conceptions posit a narrating agent external to the diegesis who is responsible for the 
presentation of the film. Although Chatman claims that his narrator is immanent to the film, 
he does not, however, sufficiently follow through the consequences of positing an immanent 
agency, and how this can be reconciled with the showing of film, instead retaining the literary 
concept of a narrator who does this showing. As will be discussed below with reference to 
Daniel Frampton, the former does not necessarily entail the latter, and in fact this showing 
activity of an agent is incompatible with immanency (involving as it does an extradiegetic 
showing by an immanent agent), leading Frampton (and others) to reject filmic narrators in 
favour of a more appropriate model of filmic agency. 
 
Accounts of filmic narrators are derived from the work of Gerard Genette, who not 
only distinguished between discourse (expression) and story (content) within narrative, but 
also introduced a third aspect of narrative, emphasising the importance of narrative agency. 1 
He describes the narrator as “[s]omeone recounting something: the act of narrating in itself” 
(26). Equivalent agents have been noted in film, with the filmic narrator regarded as narrating 
the diegesis of the film, functioning, to use Genette’s terminology, as an “extradiegetic” 
(228). However, this introduction of a narrator—traditionally a literary role—into a theory of 
point of view is problematic, for “the narrator does not ‘see’ the events of the fictional world, 
but recounts them; he or she does not observe from a post within the fictional world, but 
recalls events from a position outside the fictional universe” (Stam et al 86). It is this 
discrepancy, between the visual point of view that film seems to show and the traditional 
activity of a narrator as an extradiegetic figure, telling a story from a position external to it, 
that occupies the narratological study of filmic point of view, leading some theorists to 
dispense with talk of narrators altogether, offering reconceptualisations of point of view and 
narrative agency in the process, as we shall see.  
 
The central problem of narration in film is therefore to theorise a model of agency—
explaining how film seems to be organised to “tell” a story—compatible with the showing of 
film (which seems to grant more direct access to the events that constitute the narrative). 
Some theorists advocate the limitation or augmentation of film-narrator models, rather than 
their abandonment; others, however, propose a completely different model of filmic agency 
and mediation.2  
 
 
Narrator Alternatives 
 
Non-linguistic theories of narrative agency explore alternative conceptions of the 
manner in which film presents itself as narrative and the agency involved in this. Genette 
himself argued against conceiving film in linguistic terms, going as far as to claim that “film 
could not, properly speaking, be a narration, because it is not a linguistic being” (paraphrased 
by Metz 145). David Bordwell pursues an alternative conception of film narration that does 
not posit an external, anthropomorphic figure responsible for the narration. Bordwell instead 
attributes this function to the process of narration itself, claiming that “[t]o give every film a 
narrator or implied author is to indulge in an anthropomorphic fiction” (62). Bordwell does 
recognise that occasionally the narration will signal a narrator, such that the viewer feels the 
influence and presence of this figure as “an overriding consciousness” (225). Even in these 
cases “this sort of narrator does not create the narration; the narration, appealing to historical 
norms of viewing, creates the narrator” (62). However, this commitment to the placing of 
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narration before narrator leads Bordwell to grant anthropomorphic functions to narration, in 
which case why the distinction? As Gunning remarks, “[w]hat he has excluded in theory re-
emerges in his practice” (480). A similar point is made by André Gaudreault and François 
Jost, who criticise Bordwell’s attribution of human characteristics to an abstract process of 
narration (62). Chatman also objects to this theory of agency without an agent, pointing out 
the semantic problems involved in attributing agency to a process, stating that “[o]bjects and 
processes may have qualities, but only agents can do things” (127). 
 
However, Katherine Thomson-Jones counters this criticism, objecting to Chatman’s 
view that narration necessarily involves a narrating agent. She argues that it does not make 
sense to conceive of a filmic narrator as fictional, a supposition that leads to Chatman’s 
distinction between a (fictional) narrator and a (real) implied author, as this leads to the idea 
that this showing itself is also a fiction and thus not accepted as real by a viewer. Thomson-
Jones instead follows George Wilson’s argument against fictional showing to conclude that 
“the actual showing of a fictional story does not automatically invoke a fictional showing” 
and so “the narration of a fictional story does not automatically entail a fictional narration of 
the story” (91). The narration can therefore be attributed to a real author, occasionally 
involving the mediation of a fictional narrator.  
 
Unlike Thomson-Jones (although acknowledged within her article), Wilson explores 
the other side of the argument against fictional showing: a fictional agent (the narrator) 
presenting the fictional as actual (i.e. the fictional showing of an actual story, as opposed to 
the actual showing of a fictional story). What is significant about this move is that it removes 
the need, in the act of viewing, to locate an extradiegetic source of the on-screen images; for 
Wilson, a viewer’s experience of a fictional narrative as a real scenario is an imagining that 
this presentation does not have a determinate location or source, and therefore is “without 
dramatic mediation” (“Le Grand Imagier” 194). This idea of immanent narrative agency, 
integrated with the film world experienced by a viewer, is central to Frampton’s conception 
of film-thinking, which celebrates the fact that Wilson “returns the intention of film-being to 
the ‘film’ itself”, pointing the way towards a credible alternative to “anthropomorphic 
fictions” and discursive figures (38). 
 
 
The Filmind 
 
Frampton’s model of a “filmind” helps us to overcome some of the problems and 
questions that have arisen from these theories of cinematic showing and agency, with 
consequences for narratological issues that are not fully developed in Frampton’s account. 
Like Bordwell, Frampton is critical of the employment of anthropomorphic figures in 
theorising film narration, regarding the communication model of narrative—with its 
assumption of sender and receiver—as unnecessary in theorising filmic narrative agency, in 
that it postulates an external figure responsible for the narrative. Frampton regards this as a 
remnant of the linguistic heritage of narratology, proposing an altogether different form of 
filmic articulation in its place: one that renders narrational agency immanent within the film 
itself.  
 
It is worth mentioning Edward Branigan’s contribution to these debates here, 
paralleling Bordwell’s in employing constructivist and cognitivist principles to examine the 
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process of film narration. However, rather than emphasising an active perceiver of the 
message of film narrative but no sender, as Bordwell does, Branigan sets out a hierarchy of 
schematic levels that form the narrative text and that viewers use to organise perceptual data 
into narrative patterns, attributing shots to various focalising agents:  
 
Such concepts as “narrator,” “character” and “implied author” (and perhaps even 
“camera”) are then merely convenient labels used by the spectator in marking 
epistemological boundaries, or disparities, within an ensemble of knowledge; or 
rather, the labels become convenient in responding to narrative. (85 original 
emphasis)  
 
Although Branigan presents a more nuanced account of narrational agency than 
Bordwell, while also striving to move away from literary conceptions of narration, he still 
falls back on the idea that there is a narrating agent distinct from characters and focalisers 
within the film, and whilst now “only part of the filmgoer’s narrative schema”, it is still “a 
film agent that is not immanent in the film” (Frampton 34). 
 
In place of such narrational figures, Frampton puts forward the idea of a filmind, 
which he describes as “the theoretical originator of the images and sounds we experience, and 
‘film-thinking’ is its theory of film form, whereby an action of form is seen as the dramatic 
thinking of the filmind” (6). He emphasises that the filmind is not some intentional agency, 
external to the film: “[F]ilmosophy wishes to place the origin of film-thinking ‘in’ the film 
itself. There is no ‘external’ force, no mystical being or invisible other. It is the film that is 
steering its own (dis)course” (6). There is no separation between the filmind and the world 
that it thinks:  
 
In filmosophy the film does not have experience of things, it just has film-experience, 
or not even that, just film-thoughts. We might say that the filmind has a “film-
experience” of the objects and characters—it can never be separated from the images 
and sounds it shows. The filmind thinks an image which includes its attention and 
“objects” as one. (89)  
 
The film-world is inseparable from the thinking of the filmind, and so the filmind exists only 
in its thinking of the film-world, and is immanent within this: “[I]t both intends towards and 
‘is’ the film-world” (90). 
 
Frampton proposes that not only can the film “think” subjectively, as if from the 
perspective of one of the characters, via a point of view shot for example, but that film can 
also think “from itself”. This grants an autonomy to film-being that Frampton believes has 
not been recognised, or at least fully developed, in the work of previous theorists: “Many 
authors cannot make the leap to autonomous film[;]… cannot see that film may just be 
thinking from itself, and, only if it feels like it, through or ‘as’ characters” (85). And more 
drastically than this might suggest, this film-thinking is always primary: “[T]he filmind 
always thinks its own thoughts, whether they look like the thoughts of a character or not” 
(85).  
 
This has consequences for how we are to regard the distinction between objective and 
subjective perspectives and shots in film, reconfiguring them both as transsubjective, a term 
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that Frampton uses to describe how the filmind can be both objective and subjective. But 
properly speaking, it is neither: it does not present the film-world from the subjective 
perspective of one of the characters within it, with its thinking belonging to a character-
subject, because “the filmind always thinks it own thoughts, whether they look like the 
thoughts of a character or not” (85). And nor does it present it “objectively” from outside of 
this world, for “[t]he filmind is not outside the film, it is the film” (86). The filmind may give 
the impression of subjectivity or objectivity, or even seem to combine these positions, “such 
as when we see a drunk character through a drunken swaying defocused haze that would be 
their point of view” (87). However, ultimately “all ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ shots within 
the film are produced through the filmind’s ‘thinking’: the filmind is neither subjective or 
objective, it is both, it is transsubjective” (87). This leads to the fact that “no point of view is 
pure, it is always the filmind’s thinking” (88).  
 
This transsubjective film-being provides an alternative to the problematic models of 
narration discussed above, because as a concept it does not posit an unnecessary determinate 
narratorial location outside of the diegesis. Instead, it reintegrates and reconceptualises this 
source of the film-world as an agent that “operates from a uniquely transsubjective non-
place”, immanent within this film-world as film-specific phenomenological intentionality 
(Frampton 88 original emphasis). The result of this conceptualisation is that “all narrational 
agents are grounded in the film itself, in a singular intention that gives us scene-settings and 
character thoughts, objective viewpoints and character experience” (99). Frampton’s theory 
of a filmind has the potential to free film theory from the entanglements involved in 
theorising the place of subjectivity and agency in narration by offering a new concept of film-
being and of film-thought, which also reveals a fundamental narrative indeterminacy within 
this narrative agency, not fully explored by Frampton.3  
 
 
Transsubjectivity and Unreliable Narration 
 
 Flashback structures in film are often accompanied by a voiceover narration that 
bridges the temporal shift between the diegetic present of the framing narration and the 
recollection visualised on screen, and gives the impression that the image is thinking with the 
voiceover (as in Max Ophüls’s Letter from an Unknown Woman (1948), for example). This 
lends the image the assertive quality of language, such that—like the voiceover narration that 
accompanies it—it is regarded as making a statement that the events actually took place. This 
“narration” provided by the image is thus regarded as reliable in this manner, unless further 
information is revealed that calls into question the testimony of the voiceover narration and 
the images that seem to stem from it, such that an effect of unreliable narration is produced.  
 
Chatman argues that the sounds and images outside of a flashback are presented by a 
“cinematic narrator” whose narration frames the unreliable narration, and that both of these 
narrators (cinematic and homodiegetic) are framed by the intent of an implied author figure, 
that he describes “as the principle within the text to which we assign the inventional tasks” 
(132).4 According to Chatman, it is this figure that enables the two narrations to be compared 
and thus for one to frame the other as unreliable in accordance with the perceived intention of 
the text, which he identifies with an implied author: “Controlling both narrations [character 
and cinematic] there must be a broader textual intent—the implied author. It is the implied 
author who juxtaposes the two narrations of the story and ‘allows’ us to decide which is true” 
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(132). However, Frampton’s concept of an immanent, transsubjective thinking filmind 
enables us to regard unreliable narration in a different way as, strictly speaking, a 
homodiegetic voiceover narration does not frame the images when the film is thinking with a 
character in this manner, and, as I have discussed, the filmind removes the need to posit any 
kind of cinematic narrator.  
 
What follows from Frampton’s account is an indeterminacy of the ontological status 
(and therefore diegetic level) of the event in film; this status—as subjective or objective—
cannot be determinately asserted by the image-thinking of the film, which presents both 
objective and subjective events as transsubjective. Unreliable narratives featuring lying 
flashbacks take advantage of this transsubjective indeterminacy of film-thinking, as I will 
duly discuss in more detail. However, I argue that only the voiceover, as discourse, can be 
assigned to any one narrational location and that the images, on the contrary, are always 
necessarily independent of any such point of origin. As Frampton puts it:  
 
[A] character never completely originates a narrative, the filmind is always giving its 
version of what the character tells. This double authoring, where personal narratives 
are enclosed by the larger filmind, allows us some possible scepticism over what the 
character is relating, allows us the possibility of not believing the character (and 
removes any need to call-up an implied author). The filmind can think (imagine, 
create) the “contents” of its character’s minds [sic]. (85) 
 
The issue then becomes one of determining when and who the filmind might be 
thinking with at any particular time, while retaining the idea that the image-thinking of the 
filmind is always in fact transsubjective and so is never truly subjective or objective. 
However, Frampton does not explore the narrative indeterminacy that results from this “pure 
intentionality” of the moving image of thought created by film (87). 
 
 The image-thinking of film is not making an ontological statement or truth claim 
through its creation of thought qua moving image, and thus the supposed unreliability of the 
image in films featuring unreliable homodiegetic narrators is a misnomer: it is not making a 
claim to a reliable assertion in the first place, and so cannot be considered unreliable when 
the image is revealed as thinking with a fabrication. The images of a lying flashback should 
therefore not be considered as unreliable but, at best, as misleading, which stems from the 
creative power of film-thinking, thinking subjectively and objectively with equal veracity. 
This indeterminate ontological status (a result of the transsubjectivity of film-thought) can be 
exploited to mislead a viewer. In films where the flashback of a character is revealed as false 
(as a fabrication) the viewer may have been misled into believing that the film is thinking 
objectively when in fact it is thinking subjectively, with the homodiegetic narrator. They may 
feel deceived at having being led to this assumption, believing that the images are making 
statements of fact—that certain events took place—like the verbal testimony of the 
homodiegetic narrator. For example, in Stage Fright (Alfred Hitchcock, 1950) the 
conventional device of a dissolve and overlapping dialogue, such that it moves from voice-
on-screen to voiceover, is used to cue a flashback sequence and give the impression of 
equivalence between words and image, as if the latter were a continuation of the former.  
 
 
 
7 
	  
 
 
 
Alphaville: Journal of Film and Screen Media 
Issue 4, Winter 2012 
	  
Stage Fright 
  
Stage Fright opens with Eve Gill (Jane Wyman) and her friend Jonathan Cooper 
(Richard Todd) in a car escaping from the police to Eve’s father’s boat. When they are clear 
of the police Eve asks Jonathan, “Could you tell me now what happened? I’d really like to 
know”. Jonathan then begins to explain that their plight stemmed from Charlotte Inwood 
(Marlene Dietrich) being “in a jam”, and that he felt he had to help her. He continues, “I was 
in my kitchen, it was about 5 o’clock”, this statement accompanied by an image dissolve 
from the car to Jonathan in a kitchen drying the dishes. He continues, saying that “the 
doorbell rang and I went downstairs to see who it was”, the sound of a doorbell coinciding 
with the words being spoken about this event, and the last part of the statement fading in 
volume as we see Jonathan leave the kitchen and go downstairs. The flashback over the next 
few minutes shows Charlotte—apparently his lover—arriving at Jonathan’s and informing 
him that she has killed her husband in self-defence. She persuades Jonathan to go back to her 
house, where the murder took place, and get a new dress to replace her blood-stained one for 
a performance she has to give later. Whilst there he decides to make it look like there has 
been an intruder to explain the murder, but is seen by Charlotte’s maid, who informs the 
police. Jonathan flees and goes to his friend Eve for help, hence the pursuit that the film 
opens with. Eve, who is in love with Jonathan, then gets involved in an elaborate ruse to 
prove the guilt of Charlotte. When eventually cornered by Eve about the murder, Charlotte 
denies having killed her husband and attempts to explain the blood on her dress and how her 
husband died: “Yes, some blood did splash on my dress—I was there in the room when 
Jonathan killed my husband, but I had nothing to do with it”. She explains that after the 
murder Jonathan wanted her name kept out of it and so sent her away and made it look like 
the work of an intruder and that he then brought her a clean dress. It eventually transpires that 
Jonathan has been accused of murder before but successfully claimed self-defence: the police 
detective—and Eve’s new love interest—Wilfred Smith (Michael Wilding) declares that 
Jonathan “killed Charlotte’s husband alright, and he’s killed before”. This revelation, made 
by a character whose honesty and integrity has not been called into question, together with 
the claims of Charlotte, causes a viewer to doubt the truthfulness of Jonathan’s account and 
his reported flashback: we now have an alternative narrative of events (provided by 
Charlotte) and an undermining of the character and honesty of the initial (homodiegetic) 
narrator. The fact that Jonathan has fabricated his account of events is confirmed when he 
later confesses to Eve that he did kill Charlotte’s husband. 
 
Hitchcock’s film takes advantage of the transsubjective indeterminacy of film-
thinking in order to mislead the viewer by presenting a fabricated sequence of events as if it 
were a statement of fact (with the images seeming to continue the assertion of the voiceover): 
Jonathan’s version of events exists only in his mind, expressed through his words to Eve, and 
yet the film is able to create these thoughts as moving images and spoken dialogue within 
these. Stage Fright was novel in its breaking of the convention that the portrayal of a 
flashback could be relied upon as a truthful version of events that took place objectively, that 
had actually occurred within the diegesis, to the extent that viewers felt deceived when 
Hitchcock flouted this convention. However, we can see that the flashback itself should be 
considered as unreliable and thus deceptive only insofar as it is in a certain relationship with 
the verbal testimony of the deceiving narrator.5 
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 In Stage Fright the viewer is initially led by a homodiegetic narrator to regard the 
events that he recounts—and the images and dialogue that this voiceover seems to frame, as 
if making similar assertions—as a truthful recollection/presentation of veridical events. 
However, in Akira Kurosawa’s Rashômon (1950) there are multiple and conflicting versions 
of events put forward by several homodiegetic embedded narrators, such that they each lead 
the viewer to make certain assumptions regarding the ontological status of the image-thinking 
that seems to be framed by their verbal testimony, and only one of which can be true, or none 
of them at all. Here transsubjective indeterminacy is foregrounded, as it is not clear which 
flashback is veridical, nor who frames whom, as I will now demonstrate. 
 
 
Rashômon 
 
 Rashômon features the testimony of six different characters, each giving a different 
version of the events that led up to the murder of a man. Unlike the above examples, 
Rashômon features a doubly embedded (or metadiegetic, to use Genette’s term) narrative, 
although this framing is unclear, as I will demonstrate. The initial frame narrative features 
three men taking refuge from a storm, with one of these men, a woodcutter (Takashi 
Shimura), describing how he found a body in the woods: “It was three days ago, I’d gone to 
the hills to cut wood”. We then have the familiar flashback transition of a cut to a scene 
where the image corresponds to a certain extent with the dialogue spoken (although without 
an overlapping voiceover in this case): this next scene features a low-angle shot of a tree 
canopy, with the woodcutter walking through the forest, first stumbling upon some discarded 
belongings and then a dead body, at which point he screams and runs away. The voiceover of 
this man then states that “I ran to tell the police”, before introducing the next scene, which 
follows as a causal result of this event, as well as informing the viewer of the temporal 
interval between the various diegetic levels: “That was three days ago. Today I was called to 
give evidence”.  
 
There then follows a wipe-transition to the trial, where a series of witnesses, including 
an accused bandit called Tajomaru (Toshirô Mifune), give their respective versions of events 
within this framed situation and thus, as apparently doubly embedded. The woodcutter 
describes the belongings that he found in the wood, and then the priest’s testimony begins: “I 
saw the murdered man when he was still alive. It was three days ago in the afternoon. It was 
on the road between Sekiyama and Yamashina”. We are then given the impression of a 
flashback again, as the scene cuts from the trial to the priest walking down a road. His 
voiceover describes seeing the couple (the murder victim and his wife) as they are shown on 
horseback. In a cut-back to the trial, the priest describes how he did not think he would see 
the man again but then saw his dead body.  
 
A little later the bandit confesses: “It was me, Tajomaru, who killed him”. Tajomaru 
is shown asleep under a tree as the couple approach and pass on horse-backhorseback. Back 
at the trial he explains that he desired her and “decided to have her. I’d have her even if I had 
to kill the man”. He is then shown stalking the couple, and after leading her husband away 
ties him up and attacks the woman. She does not want to be raped and lose honour in front of 
two men and so promises to “belong to whoever kills the other”. They fight and Tajomaru 
kills her husband. The scene then switches to the framing narrative, where the priest describes 
how the woman was found by police and also gave evidence at the trial. The woodcutter 
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claims that both the bandit’s confession and woman’s story are lies. Back at the embedded 
trial the woman’s testimony then begins. She describes, and the viewer is shown, how after 
Tajomaru raped her she could not bear the way her husband looked at her and encourages 
him to kill her. She becomes angry whilst holding the dagger and then back at the trial 
describes how she fainted and when she came round she found a dagger in his chest, the 
implication being that she killed him, thus contradicting Tajomaru’s testimony. 
  
Returning to the framing narrative once more, the priest introduces the testimony of 
the dead husband speaking through a medium during the trial, whose voiceover describes 
how Tajomaru tried to persuade his wife to go with him after raping her. We then see her 
agree to this and tell Tajomaru to kill her husband, but Tajomaru turns to the husband and 
offers to kill her instead. She escapes and he goes after her. Tajomaru then returns and tells 
the husband she got away, cutting the ropes that bound him. Her husband then gets up and 
stabs himself. Again, this contradicts both Tajomaru’s and his wife’s version of events. 
  
 In the frame narrative the woodcutter refutes this, saying “there was no dagger. He 
was killed by a sword”, and then reveals that he saw more than the dead body, as he initially 
claimed, and is therefore accused of lying in his earlier story. He goes on to describe seeing 
the three of them alive, with Tajomaru “in front of the woman … begging for forgiveness”. 
The image then cuts to this scene, with Tajomaru having just raped her, again giving the 
impression of a flashback. Tajomaru tells her to come away with him and asks her to marry 
him, threatening her with death, but she will not make this decision, instead setting her 
husband free so that they can fight it out. Tajomaru then kills him and she runs away. 
Tajomaru retrieves the sword and then also escapes. Once more, we have a version of events 
that contradicts those that have gone before, the only difference here being that, unlike the 
previous characters, the apparent narrator of the flashback in this case (the woodcutter) does 
not confess that he is the culprit, but accuses someone else.  
 
 What is interesting about Rashômon is that it provides multiple versions of events 
leading up to a man’s murder (his death seeming to be the only fact not disputed in these 
various accounts), but without any one of these seeming more believable than the others, so 
that it remains unclear which, if any, of the testimonies and the images accompanying them is 
to be regarded as a faithful rendering of events. There is no authoritative narrator who seems 
believable above all the others, and therefore it remains indeterminate which of the 
collections of sounds and images that are introduced as character flashbacks are to be 
regarded as subjective—as the filmind thinking with (i.e. creating) this character’s 
fabrication—and which objective—as the filmind creating events that actually happened. 
Indeed, it is not only an issue of subjective versus objective—of believing one character over 
another—but also of the attribution of the flashback to a specific character. This is due to the 
way in which the film sets up a hierarchy of narrative levels, opening with a frame narrative 
within which a character recalls a series of events, telling a story to another character, and 
then giving the impression that the subsequent images and sounds are a depiction of this 
testimony (which of course strictly they are not, as I have described). Within this framed, 
embedded narrative the same process occurs, so that the impression of an embedded narrator 
(intradiegetic, to use Genette’s term) and a doubly embedded narrative (story-within-a-story) 
is created. However, if we are to regard the initial flashback as the filmind thinking with a 
character—that is, creating his/her testimony through images of movement and sound, such 
that it does not belong to that character as his/her own recalled experience—then the 
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flashback that seems to be within this is not necessarily framed by this character either (so 
that it is not a flashback within a flashback) but may be the filmind thinking with this 
embedded character and not necessarily through the framing character. Furthermore, it may 
indeed be interpreted as the filmind thinking this series of events with the character through 
the flashback of another character. In other words, a doubly embedded, metadiegetic 
narrative is not guaranteed in this instance, and this is due to the transsubjective mobility of 
film-thinking, which is not framed by the verbal testimony of character narrators, but creates 
the story as its own transsubjective intention, immanent within the film. It is up to the viewer 
to judge the relationship between the characters and film-thinking, and to what extent the 
latter is thinking with the former. In Rashômon this issue is complicated by the fact that the 
film sets up two homodiegetic narrators within the framing narrative: the woodcutter, who 
seems to narrate most of the embedded narrative, and the priest, who narrates (and by this I 
mean that he introduces) the testimony of the dead husband during the trial, channelled 
through a medium. 
 
  We can therefore see that the flashbacks themselves in Rashômon, apart from the 
verbal testimonies of the characters, are not unreliable but indeterminate, in terms of who 
they are thinking with and how closely they accord with the truth. And the allocation of these 
flashbacks affects their veracity, depending on how much we trust the character, ensuring that 
the viewer brings them into a position to be judged as reliable or not by associating them with 
a certain character and making judgements as to the reliability of that character. For example, 
the woodcutter reveals that he lied about finding the dead body, when he admits to the 
“commoner” character in the apparent framing narrative that he saw everything, but did not 
tell the police because he did not want to get involved, which therefore reveals that the earlier 
flashback was in fact a fabrication. The apparent source of this flashback admits its falsity 
and then proceeds to provide the impression of recalling a new version of events to put in its 
place. If the testimony of the bandit is regarded as embedded and the corresponding flashback 
as doubly embedded within the woodcutter’s flashback, then the revelation of his dishonesty 
may cause the viewer to also doubt the honesty of this apparent flashback to the trial of the 
bandit and the flashback that takes place within this (although the priest is not shown 
challenging this apparent version of events, and he claims he was also at the trial). Indeed, the 
status of the woodcutter’s flashback is subsequently complicated even further, when the 
commoner accuses the woodcutter of stealing the dagger, which therefore would have 
motivated him to deny that the dead man was killed by a dagger, as he did earlier, and invent 
a story in which he was killed by a sword, as he may well have done with his flashback. Are 
we then to believe the commoner, who at the end steals clothes from an abandoned child? 
Furthermore, the woodcutter redeems his character somewhat by adopting this baby at the 
end. 
  
 If, however, we are to regard the trial scene that follows the woodcutter’s verbal 
testimony as the filmind thinking objectively—presenting actually occurring events—i.e. as 
not framed by the woodcutter, then the flashbacks that take place within this are perhaps 
more likely to be trusted, at least in the sense of the filmind thinking with these characters (as 
opposed to thinking with these characters through the woodcutter), for they cannot both be 
trusted as veridical due to the mutual exclusivity of their content. Perhaps, then, the priest 
should be trusted, as he was not a witness and therefore offers no direct testimony of the 
events leading up to the murder, but seems to frame the testimony—and therefore also the 
flashbacks—of the husband and wife. The contradictions between these two versions of 
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events “within” the priest’s testimony thus means that taking sides with the priest still does 
not enable one to locate a truthful version of events. 
  
 The question in Rashômon, and in films featuring apparent flashbacks in general, is 
therefore not only who is telling the truth but, more fundamentally, to whom each telling 
belongs. The transsubjective mobility of film-thought leads to such indeterminacy. The 
determination of this may, as in Rashômon, involve making a judgement as to the veracity of 
the account—the supposed flashback—offered by that character, if one character is more 
trustworthy than another, or when the film is thinking objectively (and not belonging to any 
character) such that it can then be regarded as reliable or not. The important point is that in 
order for film-thinking to be regarded as reliable or not it must first be interpreted as making 
an assertion of truth, which it does not do inherently but only when tied to the testimony of a 
character, positioning him/her as a narrator, or when regarded as thinking objectively. 
Although, as I have demonstrated, film-thinking is neither properly subjective nor properly 
objective, but fundamentally transsubjective; it is always film-thinking first, which may then 
be interpreted as thinking with a character or not.6 
 
Rashômon is an early example of a film that exploits this transsubjective mobility of 
the filmic image through the use of indeterminate framing to produce a fundamentally 
indeterminate narrative, so that many interpretations seem possible, with the overall effect 
being that truth seems elusive. The viewer seems to be led by various narrator figures to a 
certain interpretation of events, but each contradicts the other, and upon further reflection the 
indeterminacy of these events seems only to increase, as I have demonstrated. 
  
 
Indeterminacy and Film-Thinking 
  
It is the transsubjective status of the filmic image that enables it to be open to 
interpretation in the manner I have suggested, thanks to the indeterminacy of film-thinking in 
terms of the ontological status of the event and of the character with whom it thinks at any 
given moment. This becomes apparent when a viewer is misled about the status of the 
image—it is the transsubjective indeterminacy of the image that enables them to be misled in 
this manner, but who is misleading here? Clearly it is not just the words of a homodiegetic 
narrator, who is not in control of the images that seem to accord with these words, but, in this 
context, it is an effect of the relationship suggested between the words and the images, with 
the filmic image framing speech (despite the contrary impression that can be given when the 
two overlap). As Frampton proposes, it makes sense to conceptualise the agent responsible 
for this as a filmind rather than as any kind of narrating agent, with the inherent connotations 
of discourse and transcendent (as opposed to immanent) figures.  
 
 As we have seen, Chatman makes the distinction between a cinematic narrator and an 
implied author (a figure on which Wilson also falls back (Narration in Light 123)) in order to 
explain the effect of unreliable narration that he locates in “lying flashback” films such as 
Stage Fright: “If the sole source of the ostensible story is a narrator, and if we come to 
believe that the ‘facts’ are not as the narrator presents them, there can only be some other and 
overriding source of the story, the source we call the implied author” (Chatman 131). 
However, we can now see, since I have argued that it only makes sense to ascribe 
unreliability to the verbal testimony of a homodiegetic narrator, that this distinction is not 
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required if we are to reconceptualise this unreliable cinematic (as opposed to homodiegetic) 
narration as indeterminate film-thinking instead.  
 
 To return to the example of Stage Fright, Chatman believes that, during the lying 
flashback, “everything that we see and hear follows Johnny’s scenario. Thus, even when his 
voice falls silent, he remains the controlling, if unreliable, narrator of the flashback”; and that 
this is distinct from the cinematic narrator who controls everything else we see and hear 
(132). Chatman claims that it “is the implied author who juxtaposes the two narrations of the 
story and ‘allows’ us to decide which is true” (132). I argue instead, influenced by Frampton, 
that this distinction between narrators is not necessary here, and that the agent responsible for 
each of these views is better regarded as a transsubjective filmind. However, in an extension 
of Frampton’s theory to cover narratological concerns with truth, authority and narrational 
agency, I propose that the nature of transsubjective film-thinking is inherently indeterminate; 
it does not present facts that are asserted as reliable in the sense that a verbal narrator does, 
but is indeterminate in terms of the status of the action that it presents and can mislead 
through the actions of its film-thought. It does not make sense to talk of film-thinking itself as 
unreliable and therefore an implied author is not necessary to explain the misleading effect of 
films like Stage Fright. The image-thinking of narrative film is unique in that, in terms of the 
events presented through the image, it is not a question of disbelieving a narrator, or 
believing one narrator over another, as if facts were being asserted through the image only to 
be challenged by other images, but of the viewer determining the ontological status and 
related diegetic level of the events being shown, which remains indeterminate within film-
thinking. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
1 Tom Gunning, for example, describes how a filmic narrator organises the different mimetic 
aspects of narrative discourse in order to tell a story, “creating a hierarchy of narratively 
important elements within a mass of contingent details …, thus carving a story out of 
photographed reality” (474). Gunning’s analysis of this narrating agency is systematic in 
terms of its treatment of the specificity of film, identifying the different levels on which the 
filmic narrator can exert an influence in order to communicate narrative to the viewer, 
including the selection of objects to be filmed, the arrangement of these objects within the 
frame, and the ordering of these framed images through the process of editing: “These three 
aspects of filmic discourse—the pro-filmic, the enframed image, and editing—almost always 
work in concert and represent the medication [sic] between story and spectator in film. They 
are how films ‘tell’ stories. Taken together, they constitute the filmic narrator” (477).  
 
2 For example, in order to account for the fact that film seems to directly show events without 
the mediation of a narrator, André Gaudreault identifies various levels of narrativity, making 
a distinction between “monstration” and narration, with monstration referring to the mimetic 
capacity of film to depict events as if they are happening in the present (citation?). According 
to Gaudreault, the narrator is manifest in the editing together of these images, which brings 
about a temporal manipulation of the natural “presentness” of the image, such that the 
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narrator creates a narrative in this way: “Only the narrator (= the editor) can inscribe between 
two shots (by means of cuts and articulation) the mark of its viewpoint, can introduce a 
guided reading and thereby transcend the temporal oneness which unavoidably constrains the 
discourse of narration” (Gaudreault 33). Both of these activities are regulated by a 
“meganarrator” which, as a grand imagier, is “responsible for the meganarrative—the film 
itself” (Gaudreault and Jost 58). Gaudreault’s theory allows for the diegetic activity of a 
narrator and the mimetic expression of the film image, distinguishing between the 
communicative mode of each (in a way which Gunning does not). However, this account 
retains the figure of an external narrating agent, derived from linguistic conceptions of 
narrative hierarchies. 
 
3 There is indeed a legacy of film-as-thought throughout film theory, and, whilst a proper 
consideration of this is beyond the scope of this article, Frampton does himself engage with 
this (15–26). Of particular note here is the work of Bruce Kawin and his idea of “mindscreen 
narration” as a kind of visual first-person narration through images of thought, distinct from 
what a character says in first-person, through voiceover, and what they see, through subject 
camera shots (10). This is an earlier attempt at considering the specific visual ontology of 
film in relation to narratological issues such as point of view and levels of narration. 
However, as with many of the figures who may be considered the forebears of his filmind, 
Frampton does not think that Kawin goes far enough in shedding literary models, being too 
concerned with finding equivalents to first-person narration, however novel the terms 
employed. Frampton’s notion of transsubjectivity allows him to avoid problems in attaching 
film-thought to determinate points of origin, writing of Kawin: “This clinging to the first-
person does not reflect the powerful free-play of film, and disallows the possibility of ‘false’ 
character thoughts or memories” (Frampton 21). However, while supplying an alternative 
model of film-thought and narrational agency, Frampton does not fully explore the 
narratological consequences of this film-being and its ramifications for conceptions of 
indeterminacy and unreliability, as I do here. Indeed, Frampton’s neglect of the narratological 
implications of his own work runs the risk of undermining his dismissal of prior theorisations 
of narrational agency in film, which is a situation I wish to address. 
 
4 Genette uses this term to describe a narrator who is “present as a character in the story he 
tells”, with a heterodiegetic narrator “absent from the story he tells” (244–5). 
 
5 Frampton, while recognising the transsubjective nature of film-thought, does not follow 
through the implications of this for a conception of unreliable narration, i.e. the unsuitability 
of this label as applied to the image, and how this leads to an inherent narrative 
indeterminacy of film-thought, as I explore here. 
 
6 There is a legacy of theories of unreliable narration in film theory, including those of Sarah 
Kozloff (112–17), David Bordwell (60–1), George Wilson (Narration in Light 39–44), Greg 
Currie (202–7) and Seymour Chatman (131–7). However, these notions of unreliability tend 
to depend on the figure of an implied author or some other external agent in order for the 
narration to be regarded as such, or cannot account for this agency coherently enough, as in 
Bordwell’s case. I argue here that the transsubjectivity of the filmic image means that we 
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should conceive of the image-thinking of film in different terms, as will become clearer in my 
discussion of Chatman’s position. 
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